Half-Moon Cookie: Private, Similarity-Based Blocklisting with TOCTOU-Attack Resilience
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 20, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.15641v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Blocklisting is a common technique for preventing the use of known malicious content. However, conventional blocklisting infrastructures require either the blocklist to be public or clients to reveal their queries to the blocklist server. In this work, we introduce a private blocklisting framework, Half-Moon Cookie, by which a client can check an item against a proprietary blocklist held by a server, to determine whether the item is close to any bl
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 17 Apr 2026]
Half-Moon Cookie: Private, Similarity-Based Blocklisting with TOCTOU-Attack Resilience
Xinyuan Zhang, Anrin Chakraborti, Michael K. Reiter
Blocklisting is a common technique for preventing the use of known malicious content. However, conventional blocklisting infrastructures require either the blocklist to be public or clients to reveal their queries to the blocklist server. In this work, we introduce a private blocklisting framework, Half-Moon Cookie, by which a client can check an item against a proprietary blocklist held by a server, to determine whether the item is close to any blocklist element in a metric space. Critically, our design separates the embedding step from the blocklist check, so that performance degrades with their sum and not their product. Still, this check might be too costly to perform on the critical path of using the item, and so our design also supports a very efficient check that an item previously passed the blocklist check. In doing so, we support applications where one client can perform the blocklist check on the item before sending it, and recipients can more efficiently confirm the previous result before using the item, thereby avoiding TOCTOU attacks. We demonstrate how Half-Moon Cookie can be instantiated for similarity-based malware detection, enabling effective identification of malicious executables without revealing client inputs or disclosing the underlying blocklist.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.15641 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.15641v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.15641
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Submission history
From: Xinyuan Zhang [view email]
[v1] Fri, 17 Apr 2026 02:35:57 UTC (432 KB)
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