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SoK: Security of Autonomous LLM Agents in Agentic Commerce

arXiv Security Archived Apr 20, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.15367v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous large language model (LLM) agents such as OpenClaw are pushing agentic commerce from human-supervised assistance toward machine actors that can negotiate, purchase services, manage digital assets, and execute transactions across on-chain and off-chain environments. Protocols such as the Trustless Agents standard (ERC-8004), Agent Payments Protocol (AP2), the HTTP 402-based payment protocol (x402), Agent Commerce Protocol (ACP), the Agent

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 15 Apr 2026] SoK: Security of Autonomous LLM Agents in Agentic Commerce Qian'ang Mao, Jiaxin Wang, Ya Liu, Li Zhu, Cong Ma, Jiaqi Yan Autonomous large language model (LLM) agents such as OpenClaw are pushing agentic commerce from human-supervised assistance toward machine actors that can negotiate, purchase services, manage digital assets, and execute transactions across on-chain and off-chain environments. Protocols such as the Trustless Agents standard (ERC-8004), Agent Payments Protocol (AP2), the HTTP 402-based payment protocol (x402), Agent Commerce Protocol (ACP), the Agentic Commerce standard (ERC-8183), and Machine Payments Protocol (MPP) enable this transition, but they also create an attack surface that existing security frameworks do not capture well. This Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) develops a unified security framework for autonomous LLM agents in commerce and finance. We organize threats along five dimensions: agent integrity, transaction authorization, inter-agent trust, market manipulation, and regulatory compliance. From a systematically curated public corpus of academic papers, protocol documents, industry reports, and incident evidence, we derive 12 cross-layer attack vectors and show how failures propagate from reasoning and tooling layers into custody, settlement, market harm, and compliance exposure. We then propose a layered defense architecture addressing authorization gaps left by current agent-payment protocols. Overall, our analysis shows that securing agentic commerce is inherently a cross-layer problem that requires coordinated controls across LLM safety, protocol design, identity, market structure, and regulation. We conclude with a research roadmap and a benchmark agenda for secure autonomous commerce. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA) Cite as: arXiv:2604.15367 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.15367v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.15367 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Qian'ang Mao [view email] [v1] Wed, 15 Apr 2026 01:55:40 UTC (55 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.MA References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 20, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 20, 2026
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