Activation-Guided Local Editing for Jailbreaking Attacks
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 16, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2508.00555v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Jailbreaking is an essential adversarial technique for red-teaming these models to uncover and patch security flaws. However, existing jailbreak methods face significant drawbacks. Token-level jailbreak attacks often produce incoherent or unreadable inputs and exhibit poor transferability, while prompt-level attacks lack scalability and rely heavily on manual effort and human ingenuity. We propose a concise and effective two-stage framework tha
Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 1 Aug 2025 (v1), last revised 15 Apr 2026 (this version, v2)]
Activation-Guided Local Editing for Jailbreaking Attacks
Jiecong Wang, Haoran Li, Hao Peng, Ziqian Zeng, Zihao Wang, Haohua Du, Zhengtao Yu
Jailbreaking is an essential adversarial technique for red-teaming these models to uncover and patch security flaws. However, existing jailbreak methods face significant drawbacks. Token-level jailbreak attacks often produce incoherent or unreadable inputs and exhibit poor transferability, while prompt-level attacks lack scalability and rely heavily on manual effort and human ingenuity. We propose a concise and effective two-stage framework that combines the advantages of these approaches. The first stage performs a scenario-based generation of context and rephrases the original malicious query to obscure its harmful intent. The second stage then utilizes information from the model's hidden states to guide fine-grained edits, effectively steering the model's internal representation of the input from a malicious toward a benign one. Extensive experiments demonstrate that this method achieves state-of-the-art Attack Success Rate, with gains of up to 37.74% over the strongest baseline, and exhibits excellent transferability to black-box models. Our analysis further demonstrates that AGILE maintains substantial effectiveness against prominent defense mechanisms, highlighting the limitations of current safeguards and providing valuable insights for future defense development. Our code is available at this https URL.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
Cite as: arXiv:2508.00555 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2508.00555v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2508.00555
Focus to learn more
Submission history
From: Jiecong Wang [view email]
[v1] Fri, 1 Aug 2025 11:52:24 UTC (670 KB)
[v2] Wed, 15 Apr 2026 07:42:17 UTC (610 KB)
Access Paper:
HTML (experimental)
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CR
< prev | next >
new | recent | 2025-08
Change to browse by:
cs
cs.AI
cs.CL
References & Citations
NASA ADS
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Export BibTeX Citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic Tools
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media
Demos
Related Papers
About arXivLabs
Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)