Threat Modeling and Attack Surface Analysis of IoT-Enabled Controlled Environment Agriculture Systems
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 16, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.13308v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The United States designates Food and Agriculture as one of sixteen critical infrastructure sectors, yet no mandatory cybersecurity requirements exist for agricultural operations and no formal threat model has been published for Controlled Environment Agriculture (CEA) systems. This paper presents the first comprehensive threat model for IoT-enabled CEA, applying STRIDE analysis, MITRE ATT&CK for ICS mapping, and IEC 62443 zone-and-conduit decompos
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 14 Apr 2026]
Threat Modeling and Attack Surface Analysis of IoT-Enabled Controlled Environment Agriculture Systems
Andrii Vakhnovskyi
The United States designates Food and Agriculture as one of sixteen critical infrastructure sectors, yet no mandatory cybersecurity requirements exist for agricultural operations and no formal threat model has been published for Controlled Environment Agriculture (CEA) systems. This paper presents the first comprehensive threat model for IoT-enabled CEA, applying STRIDE analysis, MITRE ATT&CK for ICS mapping, and IEC 62443 zone-and-conduit decomposition to a production platform deployed across 30+ commercial facilities in 8 U.S. climate zones. We enumerate 123 unique threats across 25 data-flow-diagram elements spanning 15 communication protocols, 10 of which operate with zero authentication or encryption by design. We identify five novel attack classes unique to AI-driven CEA: stealth destabilization of neural-network-tuned PID controllers, baseline drift poisoning of anomaly detectors, cross-facility propagation via federated transfer learning, adversarial agronomic schedules that exploit crop biology rather than computational models, and reward poisoning of reinforcement-learning energy optimizers. Physical impact analysis quantifies crop loss timelines from minutes (aeroponics) to days, including worker safety hazards from CO2 injection manipulation. A survey of 10 commercial CEA vendors reveals only one CVE ever issued, zero bug bounty programs, and zero IEC 62443 certifications. We propose a defense-in-depth countermeasure framework and recommend Security Level 2 as a minimum baseline.
Comments: 11 pages, 1 figure, 5 tables, 48 references
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Systems and Control (eess.SY)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.13308 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.13308v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.13308
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From: Andrii Vakhnovskyi [view email]
[v1] Tue, 14 Apr 2026 21:22:22 UTC (250 KB)
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