Can Agents Secure Hardware? Evaluating Agentic LLM-Driven Obfuscation for IP Protection
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 16, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.13298v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The globalization of integrated circuit (IC) design and manufacturing has increased the exposure of hardware intellectual property (IP) to untrusted stages of the supply chain, raising concerns about reverse engineering, piracy, tampering, and overbuilding. Hardware netlist obfuscation is a promising countermeasure, but automating the generation of functionally correct and security-relevant obfuscated circuits remains challenging, particularly for
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 14 Apr 2026]
Can Agents Secure Hardware? Evaluating Agentic LLM-Driven Obfuscation for IP Protection
Sujan Ghimire, Parsa Mirfasihi, Muhtasim Alam Chowdhury, Veeramani Pugazhenthi, Harish Kumar Dharavath, Farshad Firouzi, Rozhin Yasaei, Pratik Satam, Soheil Salehi
The globalization of integrated circuit (IC) design and manufacturing has increased the exposure of hardware intellectual property (IP) to untrusted stages of the supply chain, raising concerns about reverse engineering, piracy, tampering, and overbuilding. Hardware netlist obfuscation is a promising countermeasure, but automating the generation of functionally correct and security-relevant obfuscated circuits remains challenging, particularly for benchmark-scale designs. This paper presents an agentic, large language model (LLM)-driven framework for automated hardware netlist obfuscation. The proposed framework combines retrieval-grounded planning, structured lock-plan generation, deterministic netlist compilation, functional verification, and SAT-based security evaluation. Rather than a single prompt-to-output generation step, the framework decomposes the task into specialized stages for circuit analysis, synthesis, verification, and attack evaluation. We evaluate the framework on ISCAS-85 benchmarks using functional equivalence checking and SAT-based attacks. Results show that the framework generates correct locked netlists while introducing measurable output corruption under incorrect keys, while SAT attacks remain effective. These findings highlight both the potential and current limitations of agentic LLM-driven obfuscation.
Comments: 5 pages, 3 figures,
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.13298 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.13298v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.13298
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Submission history
From: Sujan Ghimire [view email]
[v1] Tue, 14 Apr 2026 21:04:48 UTC (241 KB)
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