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Evaluating Differential Privacy Against Membership Inference in Federated Learning: Insights from the NIST Genomics Red Team Challenge

arXiv Security Archived Apr 15, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.12737v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: While Federated Learning (FL) mitigates direct data exposure, the resulting trained models remain susceptible to membership inference attacks (MIAs). This paper presents an empirical evaluation of Differential Privacy (DP) as a defense mechanism against MIAs in FL, leveraging the environment of the 2025 NIST Genomics Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning (PPFL) Red Teaming Event. To improve inference accuracy, we propose a stacking attack strategy

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 14 Apr 2026] Evaluating Differential Privacy Against Membership Inference in Federated Learning: Insights from the NIST Genomics Red Team Challenge Gustavo de Carvalho Bertoli While Federated Learning (FL) mitigates direct data exposure, the resulting trained models remain susceptible to membership inference attacks (MIAs). This paper presents an empirical evaluation of Differential Privacy (DP) as a defense mechanism against MIAs in FL, leveraging the environment of the 2025 NIST Genomics Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning (PPFL) Red Teaming Event. To improve inference accuracy, we propose a stacking attack strategy that ensembles seven black-box estimators to train a meta-classifier on prediction probabilities and cross-entropy losses. We evaluate this methodology against target models under three privacy configurations: an unprotected convolutional neural network (CNN, \epsilon=\infty), a low-privacy DP model (\epsilon=200), and a high-privacy DP model (\epsilon=10). The attack outperforms all baselines in the No DP and Low Privacy settings and, critically, maintains measurable membership leakage at \epsilon=200 where a single-signal LiRA baseline collapses. Evaluated on an independent third-party benchmark, these results provide an empirical characterisation of how stacking-based inference degrades across calibrated DP tiers in FL. Comments: 21 pages Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2604.12737 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.12737v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.12737 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Gustavo De Carvalho Bertoli [view email] [v1] Tue, 14 Apr 2026 13:51:02 UTC (237 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 15, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 15, 2026
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