Compiling Activation Steering into Weights via Null-Space Constraints for Stealthy Backdoors
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 15, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.12359v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world pipelines, yet this deployment also enlarges the supply-chain attack surface: adversaries can distribute backdoored checkpoints that behave normally under standard evaluation but jailbreak when a hidden trigger is present. Recent post-hoc weight-editing methods offer an efficient approach to injecting such backdoors by directly modifying model weights to map a trigg
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 14 Apr 2026]
Compiling Activation Steering into Weights via Null-Space Constraints for Stealthy Backdoors
Rui Yin, Tianxu Han, Naen Xu, Changjiang Li, Ping He, Chunyi Zhou, Jun Wang, Zhihui Fu, Tianyu Du, Jinbao Li, Shouling Ji
Safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world pipelines, yet this deployment also enlarges the supply-chain attack surface: adversaries can distribute backdoored checkpoints that behave normally under standard evaluation but jailbreak when a hidden trigger is present. Recent post-hoc weight-editing methods offer an efficient approach to injecting such backdoors by directly modifying model weights to map a trigger to an attacker-specified response. However, existing methods typically optimize a token-level mapping that forces an affirmative prefix (e.g., ``Sure''), which does not guarantee sustained harmful output -- the model may begin with apparent agreement yet revert to safety-aligned refusal within a few decoding steps. We address this reliability gap by shifting the backdoor objective from surface tokens to internal representations. We extract a steering vector that captures the difference between compliant and refusal behaviors, and compile it into a persistent weight modification that activates only when the trigger is present. To preserve stealthiness and benign utility, we impose a null-space constraint so that the injected edit remains dormant on clean inputs. The method is efficient, requiring only a small set of examples and admitting a closed-form solution. Across multiple safety-aligned LLMs and jailbreak benchmarks, our method achieves high triggered attack success while maintaining non-triggered safety and general utility.
Comments: ACL 2026 Main Conference
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.12359 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.12359v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.12359
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Submission history
From: Rui Yin [view email]
[v1] Tue, 14 Apr 2026 06:48:33 UTC (1,652 KB)
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