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LLM-Redactor: An Empirical Evaluation of Eight Techniques for Privacy-Preserving LLM Requests

arXiv Security Archived Apr 15, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.12064v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Coding agents and LLM-powered applications routinely send potentially sensitive content to cloud LLM APIs where it may be logged, retained, used for training, or subpoenaed. Existing privacy tooling focuses on network-level encryption and organization-level DLP, neither of which addresses the content of prompts themselves. We present a systematic empirical evaluation of eight techniques for privacy-preserving LLM requests: (A) local-only inference,

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 13 Apr 2026] LLM-Redactor: An Empirical Evaluation of Eight Techniques for Privacy-Preserving LLM Requests Justice Owusu Agyemang, Jerry John Kponyo, Elliot Amponsah, Godfred Manu Addo Boakye, Kwame Opuni-Boachie Obour Agyekum Coding agents and LLM-powered applications routinely send potentially sensitive content to cloud LLM APIs where it may be logged, retained, used for training, or subpoenaed. Existing privacy tooling focuses on network-level encryption and organization-level DLP, neither of which addresses the content of prompts themselves. We present a systematic empirical evaluation of eight techniques for privacy-preserving LLM requests: (A) local-only inference, (B) redaction with placeholder restoration, (C) semantic rephrasing, (D) Trusted Execution Environment hosted inference, (E) split inference, (F) fully homomorphic encryption, (G) secret sharing via multi-party computation, and (H) differential-privacy noise. We implement all eight (or a tractable research-stage subset where deployment is not yet feasible) in an open-source shim compatible with MCP and any OpenAI-compatible API. We evaluate the four practical options (A, B, C, H) and their combinations across four workload classes using a ground-truth-labelled leak benchmark of 1,300 samples with 4,014 annotations. Our headline finding is that no single technique dominates: the combination A+B+C (route locally when possible, redact and rephrase the rest) achieves 0.6% combined leak on PII and 31.3% on proprietary code, with zero exact leaks on PII across 500 samples. We present a decision rule that selects the appropriate option(s) from a threat-model budget and workload characterisation. Code, benchmarks, and evaluation harness are released at this https URL. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Software Engineering (cs.SE) Cite as: arXiv:2604.12064 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.12064v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.12064 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Justice Owusu Agyemang [view email] [v1] Mon, 13 Apr 2026 21:05:42 UTC (41 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.SE References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 15, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 15, 2026
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