Evaluating Lightweight Block Cipher Payload Encryption for Real-Time CAN Traffic

Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 13 Apr 2026] Evaluating Lightweight Block Cipher Payload Encryption for Real-Time CAN Traffic Kevin Setterstrom, Jeremy Straub This study evaluates the feasibility of integrating lightweight block cipher payload encryption into a real-time embedded controller area network (CAN) node using a QT PY ESP32-S2 microcontroller. This work seeks to determine whether the use of a block cipher can prevent semantic taxonomy-based reverse engineering, which infers signal meaning from unencrypted CAN traffic using observation and statistical analysis. CAN payloads are encrypted using a lightweight block cipher and evaluated through experiments that measure timing impact, payload pattern observability, and correlation-based inference. Results indicate that encryption masks constant values and predictable signal patterns while preserving a 100 Hz transmission schedule. These findings suggest that lightweight payload encryption can reduce passive, observation based inference of CAN signal semantics on resource-constrained hardware with limited timing overhead impact. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2604.11853 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.11853v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.11853 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Jeremy Straub [view email] [v1] Mon, 13 Apr 2026 04:14:52 UTC (1,790 KB) Access Paper: view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)