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Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution

arXiv Security Archived Apr 14, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.10271v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In what way could a data breach involving government-issued IDs such as passports, driver's licenses, etc., rival a random voluntary disclosure on a nondescript social-media platform? At first glance, the former appears more significant, and that is a valid assessment. The disclosed data could contain an individual's date of birth and address; for all intents and purposes, a leak of that data would be disastrous. Given the threat, the latter scenar

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 11 Apr 2026] Hijacking Text Heritage: Hiding the Human Signature through Homoglyphic Substitution Robert Dilworth In what way could a data breach involving government-issued IDs such as passports, driver's licenses, etc., rival a random voluntary disclosure on a nondescript social-media platform? At first glance, the former appears more significant, and that is a valid assessment. The disclosed data could contain an individual's date of birth and address; for all intents and purposes, a leak of that data would be disastrous. Given the threat, the latter scenario involving an innocuous online post seems comparatively harmless--or does it? From that post and others like it, a forensic linguist could stylometrically uncover equivalent pieces of information, estimating an age range for the author (adolescent or adult) and narrowing down their geographical location (specific country). While not an exact science--the determinations are statistical--stylometry can reveal comparable, though noticeably diluted, information about an individual. To prevent an ID from being breached, simply sharing it as little as possible suffices. Preventing the leakage of personal information from written text requires a more complex solution: adversarial stylometry. In this paper, we explore how performing homoglyph substitution--the replacement of characters with visually similar alternatives (e.g., "h" \texttt{[U+0068]} \rightarrow "h" \texttt{[U+04BB]})--on text can degrade stylometric systems. Comments: 30 pages, 9 figures Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Information Retrieval (cs.IR) Cite as: arXiv:2604.10271 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.10271v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.10271 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Robert Dilworth [view email] [v1] Sat, 11 Apr 2026 16:27:32 UTC (6,738 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.CL cs.IR References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 14, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 14, 2026
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