PlanGuard: Defending Agents against Indirect Prompt Injection via Planning-based Consistency Verification
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 14, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.10134v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly integrated into critical systems, leveraging external tools to interact with the real world. However, this capability exposes them to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI), where attackers embed malicious instructions into retrieved content to manipulate the agent into executing unauthorized or unintended actions. Existing defenses predominantly focus on the pre-processing stage, neglecting the monitorin
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 11 Apr 2026]
PlanGuard: Defending Agents against Indirect Prompt Injection via Planning-based Consistency Verification
Guangyu Gong, Zizhuang Deng
Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly integrated into critical systems, leveraging external tools to interact with the real world. However, this capability exposes them to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI), where attackers embed malicious instructions into retrieved content to manipulate the agent into executing unauthorized or unintended actions. Existing defenses predominantly focus on the pre-processing stage, neglecting the monitoring of the model's actual behavior. In this paper, we propose PlanGuard, a training-free defense framework based on the principle of Context Isolation. Unlike prior methods, PlanGuard introduces an isolated Planner that generates a reference set of valid actions derived solely from user instructions. In addition, we design a Hierarchical Verification Mechanism that first enforces strict hard constraints to block unauthorized tool invocations, and subsequently employs an Intent Verifier to validate whether parameter deviations are benign formatting variances or malicious hijacking. Experiments on the InjecAgent benchmark demonstrate that PlanGuard effectively neutralizes these attacks, reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) from 72.8% to 0%, while maintaining an acceptable False Positive Rate of 1.49%. Furthermore, our method is model-agnostic and highly compatible.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.10134 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.10134v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.10134
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Submission history
From: Guangyu Gong [view email]
[v1] Sat, 11 Apr 2026 09:59:46 UTC (255 KB)
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