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Leave My Images Alone: Preventing Multi-Modal Large Language Models from Analyzing Images via Visual Prompt Injection

arXiv Security Archived Apr 13, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.09024v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) have emerged as powerful tools for analyzing Internet-scale image data, offering significant benefits but also raising critical safety and societal concerns. In particular, open-weight MLLMs may be misused to extract sensitive information from personal images at scale, such as identities, locations, or other private details. In this work, we propose ImageProtector, a user-side method that proactively prot

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    Computer Science > Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition [Submitted on 10 Apr 2026] Leave My Images Alone: Preventing Multi-Modal Large Language Models from Analyzing Images via Visual Prompt Injection Zedian Shao, Hongbin Liu, Yuepeng Hu, Neil Zhenqiang Gong Multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) have emerged as powerful tools for analyzing Internet-scale image data, offering significant benefits but also raising critical safety and societal concerns. In particular, open-weight MLLMs may be misused to extract sensitive information from personal images at scale, such as identities, locations, or other private details. In this work, we propose ImageProtector, a user-side method that proactively protects images before sharing by embedding a carefully crafted, nearly imperceptible perturbation that acts as a visual prompt injection attack on MLLMs. As a result, when an adversary analyzes a protected image with an MLLM, the MLLM is consistently induced to generate a refusal response such as "I'm sorry, I can't help with that request." We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of ImageProtector across six MLLMs and four datasets. Additionally, we evaluate three potential countermeasures, Gaussian noise, DiffPure, and adversarial training, and show that while they partially mitigate the impact of ImageProtector, they simultaneously degrade model accuracy and/or efficiency. Our study focuses on the practically important setting of open-weight MLLMs and large-scale automated image analysis, and highlights both the promise and the limitations of perturbation-based privacy protection. Comments: Appeared in ACL 2026 main conference Subjects: Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2604.09024 [cs.CV]   (or arXiv:2604.09024v1 [cs.CV] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.09024 Focus to learn more Journal reference: The 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL 2026) Submission history From: Zedian Shao [view email] [v1] Fri, 10 Apr 2026 06:37:46 UTC (1,386 KB) Access Paper: view license Current browse context: cs.CV < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.CR cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 13, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 13, 2026
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