Leave My Images Alone: Preventing Multi-Modal Large Language Models from Analyzing Images via Visual Prompt Injection
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 13, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.09024v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) have emerged as powerful tools for analyzing Internet-scale image data, offering significant benefits but also raising critical safety and societal concerns. In particular, open-weight MLLMs may be misused to extract sensitive information from personal images at scale, such as identities, locations, or other private details. In this work, we propose ImageProtector, a user-side method that proactively prot
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
[Submitted on 10 Apr 2026]
Leave My Images Alone: Preventing Multi-Modal Large Language Models from Analyzing Images via Visual Prompt Injection
Zedian Shao, Hongbin Liu, Yuepeng Hu, Neil Zhenqiang Gong
Multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) have emerged as powerful tools for analyzing Internet-scale image data, offering significant benefits but also raising critical safety and societal concerns. In particular, open-weight MLLMs may be misused to extract sensitive information from personal images at scale, such as identities, locations, or other private details. In this work, we propose ImageProtector, a user-side method that proactively protects images before sharing by embedding a carefully crafted, nearly imperceptible perturbation that acts as a visual prompt injection attack on MLLMs. As a result, when an adversary analyzes a protected image with an MLLM, the MLLM is consistently induced to generate a refusal response such as "I'm sorry, I can't help with that request." We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of ImageProtector across six MLLMs and four datasets. Additionally, we evaluate three potential countermeasures, Gaussian noise, DiffPure, and adversarial training, and show that while they partially mitigate the impact of ImageProtector, they simultaneously degrade model accuracy and/or efficiency. Our study focuses on the practically important setting of open-weight MLLMs and large-scale automated image analysis, and highlights both the promise and the limitations of perturbation-based privacy protection.
Comments: Appeared in ACL 2026 main conference
Subjects: Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.09024 [cs.CV]
(or arXiv:2604.09024v1 [cs.CV] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.09024
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Journal reference: The 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL 2026)
Submission history
From: Zedian Shao [view email]
[v1] Fri, 10 Apr 2026 06:37:46 UTC (1,386 KB)
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