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Unreal Thinking: Chain-of-Thought Hijacking via Two-stage Backdoor

arXiv Security Archived Apr 13, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.09235v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in settings where Chain-of-Thought (CoT) is interpreted by users. This creates a new safety risk: attackers may manipulate the model's observable CoT to make malicious behaviors. In open-weight ecosystems, such manipulation can be embedded in lightweight adapters that are easy to distribute and attach to base models. In practice, persistent CoT hijacking faces three main challenges: the difficu

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 10 Apr 2026] Unreal Thinking: Chain-of-Thought Hijacking via Two-stage Backdoor Wenhan Chang, Tianqing Zhu, Ping Xiong, Faqian Guan, Wanlei Zhou Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in settings where Chain-of-Thought (CoT) is interpreted by users. This creates a new safety risk: attackers may manipulate the model's observable CoT to make malicious behaviors. In open-weight ecosystems, such manipulation can be embedded in lightweight adapters that are easy to distribute and attach to base models. In practice, persistent CoT hijacking faces three main challenges: the difficulty of directly hijacking CoT tokens within one continuous long CoT-output sequence while maintaining stable downstream outputs, the scarcity of malicious CoT data, and the instability of naive backdoor injection methods. To address the data scarcity issue, we propose Multiple Reverse Tree Search (MRTS), a reverse synthesis procedure that constructs output-aligned CoTs from prompt-output pairs without directly eliciting malicious CoTs from aligned models. Building on MRTS, we introduce Two-stage Backdoor Hijacking (TSBH), which first induces a trigger-conditioned mismatch between intermediate CoT and malicious outputs, and then fine-tunes the model on MRTS-generated CoTs that have lower embedding distance to the malicious outputs, thereby ensuring stronger semantic similarity. Experiments across multiple open-weight models demonstrate that our method successfully induces trigger-activated CoT hijacking while maintaining a quantifiable distinction between hijacked and baseline states under our evaluation framework. We further explore a reasoning-based mitigation approach and release a safety-reasoning dataset to support future research on safety-aware and reliable reasoning. Our code is available at this https URL. Comments: 18 pages, 4 figures Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2604.09235 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.09235v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.09235 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Wenhan Chang [view email] [v1] Fri, 10 Apr 2026 11:44:27 UTC (583 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 13, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 13, 2026
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