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Tracing the Chain: Deep Learning for Stepping-Stone Intrusion Detection

arXiv Security Archived Apr 13, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.08800v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Stepping-stone intrusions (SSIs) are a prevalent network evasion technique in which attackers route sessions through chains of compromised intermediate hosts to obscure their origin. Effective SSI detection requires correlating the incoming and outgoing flows at each relay host at extremely low false positive rates -- a stringent requirement that renders classical statistical methods inadequate in operational settings. We apply ESPRESSO, a deep lea

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 9 Apr 2026] Tracing the Chain: Deep Learning for Stepping-Stone Intrusion Detection Nate Mathews, Nicholas Hopper, Matthew Wright Stepping-stone intrusions (SSIs) are a prevalent network evasion technique in which attackers route sessions through chains of compromised intermediate hosts to obscure their origin. Effective SSI detection requires correlating the incoming and outgoing flows at each relay host at extremely low false positive rates -- a stringent requirement that renders classical statistical methods inadequate in operational settings. We apply ESPRESSO, a deep learning flow correlation model combining a transformer-based feature extraction network, time-aligned multi-channel interval features, and online triplet metric learning, to the problem of stepping-stone intrusion detection. To support training and evaluation, we develop a synthetic data collection tool that generates realistic stepping-stone traffic across five tunneling protocols: SSH, SOCAT, ICMP, DNS, and mixed multi-protocol chains. Across all five protocols and in both host-mode and network-mode detection scenarios, ESPRESSO substantially outperforms the state-of-the-art DeepCoFFEA baseline, achieving a true positive rate exceeding 0.99 at a false positive rate of 10^{-3} for standard bursty protocols in network-mode. We further demonstrate chain length prediction as a tool for distinguishing malicious from benign pivoting, and conduct a systematic robustness analysis revealing that timing-based perturbations are the primary vulnerability of correlation-based stepping-stone detectors. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2604.08800 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.08800v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.08800 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Nate Mathews [view email] [v1] Thu, 9 Apr 2026 22:26:52 UTC (9,049 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 13, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 13, 2026
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