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Semantic Intent Fragmentation: A Single-Shot Compositional Attack on Multi-Agent AI Pipelines

arXiv Security Archived Apr 13, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.08608v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We introduce Semantic Intent Fragmentation (SIF), an attack class against LLM orchestration systems where a single, legitimately phrased request causes an orchestrator to decompose a task into subtasks that are individually benign but jointly violate security policy. Current safety mechanisms operate at the subtask level, so each step clears existing classifiers -- the violation only emerges at the composed plan. SIF exploits OWASP LLM06:2025 throu

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 8 Apr 2026] Semantic Intent Fragmentation: A Single-Shot Compositional Attack on Multi-Agent AI Pipelines Tanzim Ahad, Ismail Hossain, Md Jahangir Alam, Sai Puppala, Yoonpyo Lee, Syed Bahauddin Alam, Sajedul Talukder We introduce Semantic Intent Fragmentation (SIF), an attack class against LLM orchestration systems where a single, legitimately phrased request causes an orchestrator to decompose a task into subtasks that are individually benign but jointly violate security policy. Current safety mechanisms operate at the subtask level, so each step clears existing classifiers -- the violation only emerges at the composed plan. SIF exploits OWASP LLM06:2025 through four mechanisms: bulk scope escalation, silent data exfiltration, embedded trigger deployment, and quasi-identifier aggregation, requiring no injected content, no system modification, and no attacker interaction after the initial request. We construct a three-stage red-teaming pipeline grounded in OWASP, MITRE ATLAS, and NIST frameworks to generate realistic enterprise scenarios. Across 14 scenarios spanning financial reporting, information security, and HR analytics, a GPT-20B orchestrator produces policy-violating plans in 71% of cases (10/14) while every subtask appears benign. Three independent signals validate this: deterministic taint analysis, chain-of-thought evaluation, and a cross-model compliance judge with 0% false positives. Stronger orchestrators increase SIF success rates. Plan-level information-flow tracking combined with compliance evaluation detects all attacks before execution, showing the compositional safety gap is closable. Comments: This paper got accepted for AAAI 2026 Summer Symposium Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2604.08608 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.08608v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.08608 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Ismail Hossain [view email] [v1] Wed, 8 Apr 2026 18:19:03 UTC (204 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 13, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 13, 2026
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