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Securing Retrieval-Augmented Generation: A Taxonomy of Attacks, Defenses, and Future Directions

arXiv Security Archived Apr 10, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.08304v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) significantly enhances large language models (LLMs) but introduces novel security risks through external knowledge access. While existing studies cover various RAG vulnerabilities, they often conflate inherent LLM risks with those specifically introduced by RAG. In this paper, we propose that secure RAG is fundamentally about the security of the external knowledge-access pipeline. We establish an operational bou

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 9 Apr 2026] Securing Retrieval-Augmented Generation: A Taxonomy of Attacks, Defenses, and Future Directions Yuming Xu, Mingtao Zhang, Zhuohan Ge, Haoyang Li, Nicole Hu, Jason Chen Zhang, Qing Li, Lei Chen Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) significantly enhances large language models (LLMs) but introduces novel security risks through external knowledge access. While existing studies cover various RAG vulnerabilities, they often conflate inherent LLM risks with those specifically introduced by RAG. In this paper, we propose that secure RAG is fundamentally about the security of the external knowledge-access pipeline. We establish an operational boundary to separate inherent LLM flaws from RAG-introduced or RAG-amplified threats. Guided by this perspective, we abstract the RAG workflow into six stages and organize the literature around three trust boundaries and four primary security surfaces, including pre-retrieval knowledge corruption, retrieval-time access manipulation, downstream context exploitation, and knowledge exfiltration. By systematically reviewing the corresponding attacks, defenses, remediation mechanisms, and evaluation benchmarks, we reveal that current defenses remain largely reactive and fragmented. Finally, we discuss these gaps and highlight future directions toward layered, boundary-aware protection across the entire knowledge-access lifecycle. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2604.08304 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.08304v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.08304 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Haoyang Li [view email] [v1] Thu, 9 Apr 2026 14:38:18 UTC (359 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 10, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 10, 2026
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