Securing Retrieval-Augmented Generation: A Taxonomy of Attacks, Defenses, and Future Directions
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 10, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.08304v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) significantly enhances large language models (LLMs) but introduces novel security risks through external knowledge access. While existing studies cover various RAG vulnerabilities, they often conflate inherent LLM risks with those specifically introduced by RAG. In this paper, we propose that secure RAG is fundamentally about the security of the external knowledge-access pipeline. We establish an operational bou
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 9 Apr 2026]
Securing Retrieval-Augmented Generation: A Taxonomy of Attacks, Defenses, and Future Directions
Yuming Xu, Mingtao Zhang, Zhuohan Ge, Haoyang Li, Nicole Hu, Jason Chen Zhang, Qing Li, Lei Chen
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) significantly enhances large language models (LLMs) but introduces novel security risks through external knowledge access. While existing studies cover various RAG vulnerabilities, they often conflate inherent LLM risks with those specifically introduced by RAG. In this paper, we propose that secure RAG is fundamentally about the security of the external knowledge-access pipeline. We establish an operational boundary to separate inherent LLM flaws from RAG-introduced or RAG-amplified threats. Guided by this perspective, we abstract the RAG workflow into six stages and organize the literature around three trust boundaries and four primary security surfaces, including pre-retrieval knowledge corruption, retrieval-time access manipulation, downstream context exploitation, and knowledge exfiltration. By systematically reviewing the corresponding attacks, defenses, remediation mechanisms, and evaluation benchmarks, we reveal that current defenses remain largely reactive and fragmented. Finally, we discuss these gaps and highlight future directions toward layered, boundary-aware protection across the entire knowledge-access lifecycle.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.08304 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.08304v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.08304
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From: Haoyang Li [view email]
[v1] Thu, 9 Apr 2026 14:38:18 UTC (359 KB)
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