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Are GUI Agents Focused Enough? Automated Distraction via Semantic-level UI Element Injection

arXiv Security Archived Apr 10, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.07831v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Existing red-teaming studies on GUI agents have important limitations. Adversarial perturbations typically require white-box access, which is unavailable for commercial systems, while prompt injection is increasingly mitigated by stronger safety alignment. To study robustness under a more practical threat model, we propose Semantic-level UI Element Injection, a red-teaming setting that overlays safety-aligned and harmless UI elements onto screensho

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 9 Apr 2026] Are GUI Agents Focused Enough? Automated Distraction via Semantic-level UI Element Injection Wenkui Yang, Chao Jin, Haisu Zhu, Weilin Luo, Derek Yuen, Kun Shao, Huaibo Huang, Junxian Duan, Jie Cao, Ran He Existing red-teaming studies on GUI agents have important limitations. Adversarial perturbations typically require white-box access, which is unavailable for commercial systems, while prompt injection is increasingly mitigated by stronger safety alignment. To study robustness under a more practical threat model, we propose Semantic-level UI Element Injection, a red-teaming setting that overlays safety-aligned and harmless UI elements onto screenshots to misdirect the agent's visual grounding. Our method uses a modular Editor-Overlapper-Victim pipeline and an iterative search procedure that samples multiple candidate edits, keeps the best cumulative overlay, and adapts future prompt strategies based on previous failures. Across five victim models, our optimized attacks improve attack success rate by up to 4.4x over random injection on the strongest victims. Moreover, elements optimized on one source model transfer effectively to other target models, indicating model-agnostic vulnerabilities. After the first successful attack, the victim still clicks the attacker-controlled element in more than 15% of later independent trials, versus below 1% for random injection, showing that the injected element acts as a persistent attractor rather than simple visual clutter. Comments: 44 pages, 10 figures, public code will be available at this https URL Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV) Cite as: arXiv:2604.07831 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.07831v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.07831 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Wenkui Yang [view email] [v1] Thu, 9 Apr 2026 05:32:34 UTC (6,448 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.CL cs.CV References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 10, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 10, 2026
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