CyberIntel ⬡ News
★ Saved ◆ Cyber Reads
← Back ◬ AI & Machine Learning Apr 10, 2026

The Art of (Mis)alignment: How Fine-Tuning Methods Effectively Misalign and Realign LLMs in Post-Training

arXiv Security Archived Apr 10, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.07754v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The deployment of large language models (LLMs) raises significant ethical and safety concerns. While LLM alignment techniques are adopted to improve model safety and trustworthiness, adversaries can exploit these techniques to undermine safety for malicious purposes, resulting in \emph{misalignment}. Misaligned LLMs may be published on open platforms to magnify harm. To address this, additional safety alignment, referred to as \emph{realignment}, i

Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 9 Apr 2026] The Art of (Mis)alignment: How Fine-Tuning Methods Effectively Misalign and Realign LLMs in Post-Training Rui Zhang, Hongwei Li, Yun Shen, Xinyue Shen, Wenbo Jiang, Guowen Xu, Yang Liu, Michael Backes, Yang Zhang The deployment of large language models (LLMs) raises significant ethical and safety concerns. While LLM alignment techniques are adopted to improve model safety and trustworthiness, adversaries can exploit these techniques to undermine safety for malicious purposes, resulting in \emph{misalignment}. Misaligned LLMs may be published on open platforms to magnify harm. To address this, additional safety alignment, referred to as \emph{realignment}, is necessary before deploying untrusted third-party LLMs. This study explores the efficacy of fine-tuning methods in terms of misalignment, realignment, and the effects of their interplay. By evaluating four Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and two Preference Fine-Tuning (PFT) methods across four popular safety-aligned LLMs, we reveal a mechanism asymmetry between attack and defense. While Odds Ratio Preference Optimization (ORPO) is most effective for misalignment, Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) excels in realignment, albeit at the expense of model utility. Additionally, we identify model-specific resistance, residual effects of multi-round adversarial dynamics, and other noteworthy findings. These findings highlight the need for robust safeguards and customized safety alignment strategies to mitigate potential risks in the deployment of LLMs. Our code is available at this https URL. Comments: Accepted by ACL Findings 2026 Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL) Cite as: arXiv:2604.07754 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.07754v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.07754 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Rui Zhang [view email] [v1] Thu, 9 Apr 2026 03:20:29 UTC (3,790 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.CL References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
    💬 Team Notes
    Article Info
    Source
    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 10, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 10, 2026
    Full Text
    ✓ Saved locally
    Open Original ↗