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MEV-ACE: Identity-Authenticated Fair Ordering for Proposer-Controlled MEV Mitigation

arXiv Security Archived Apr 10, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.07568v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Maximal Extractable Value, or MEV, remains a structural threat to blockchain fairness because a block producer can often observe pending transactions and unilaterally decide their ordering or inclusion. Existing mitigations hide transaction contents or outsource ordering, but they often leave two gaps unresolved. First, commitments are not authenticated by slashable identities. Second, inclusion obligations are not backed by transferable evidence t

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 8 Apr 2026] MEV-ACE: Identity-Authenticated Fair Ordering for Proposer-Controlled MEV Mitigation Jian Sheng Wang Maximal Extractable Value, or MEV, remains a structural threat to blockchain fairness because a block producer can often observe pending transactions and unilaterally decide their ordering or inclusion. Existing mitigations hide transaction contents or outsource ordering, but they often leave two gaps unresolved. First, commitments are not authenticated by slashable identities. Second, inclusion obligations are not backed by transferable evidence that other validators can verify. This paper presents MEV ACE, a fair ordering protocol for proposer controlled ordering MEV. MEV ACE combines three mechanisms. First, it uses registered economic identities whose authentication keys are deterministically derived from the ACE GF framework and bonded on chain. Second, it uses authenticated commit and open messages with validator receipt thresholds, which make admissibility and inclusion obligations independently auditable. Third, it uses verifiable delay based randomness to determine transaction order only after the admissible commitment set is fixed. We formalize the protocol in a Byzantine fault tolerant validator model with threshold receipts and show three properties under standard assumptions: order unpredictability after the admissible set is locked, commitment authenticity under signature unforgeability, and accountable inclusion for transactions that obtain threshold commit and open receipts. Under these conditions, and when producer and user bonds exceed the one slot gain from invalid execution or selective non opening, MEV ACE removes unilateral proposer discretion over front running, sandwich attacks, and censorship against admitted transactions. The protocol remains single slot in structure, requires no threshold decryption committee, and is compatible with post quantum signature schemes such as ML DSA 44. Comments: 18 Pages Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC) Cite as: arXiv:2604.07568 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.07568v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.07568 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Jian Sheng Wang [view email] [v1] Wed, 8 Apr 2026 20:12:06 UTC (16 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.DC References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 10, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 10, 2026
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