MCP-DPT: A Defense-Placement Taxonomy and Coverage Analysis for Model Context Protocol Security
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 10, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.07551v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The Model Context Protocol (MCP) enables large language models (LLMs) to dynamically discover and invoke third-party tools, significantly expanding agent capabilities while introducing a distinct security landscape. Unlike prompt-only interactions, MCP exposes pre-execution artifacts, shared context, multi-turn workflows, and third-party supply chains to adversarial influence across independently operated components. While recent work has identifie
Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 8 Apr 2026]
MCP-DPT: A Defense-Placement Taxonomy and Coverage Analysis for Model Context Protocol Security
Mehrdad Rostamzadeh, Sidhant Narula, Nahom Birhan, Mohammad Ghasemigol, Daniel Takabi
The Model Context Protocol (MCP) enables large language models (LLMs) to dynamically discover and invoke third-party tools, significantly expanding agent capabilities while introducing a distinct security landscape. Unlike prompt-only interactions, MCP exposes pre-execution artifacts, shared context, multi-turn workflows, and third-party supply chains to adversarial influence across independently operated components. While recent work has identified MCP-specific attacks and evaluated defenses, existing studies are largely attack-centric or benchmark-driven, providing limited guidance on where mitigation responsibility should reside within the MCP architecture. This is problematic given MCP's multi-party design and distributed trust boundaries. We present a defense-placement-oriented security analysis of MCP, introducing a layer-aligned taxonomy that organizes attacks by the architectural component responsible for enforcement. Threats are mapped across six MCP layers, and primary and secondary defense points are identified to support principled defense-in-depth reasoning under adversaries controlling tools, servers, or ecosystem components. A structured mapping of existing academic and industry defenses onto this framework reveals uneven and predominantly tool-centric protection, with persistent gaps at the host orchestration, transport, and supply-chain layers. These findings suggest that many MCP security weaknesses stem from architectural misalignment rather than isolated implementation flaws.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.07551 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.07551v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.07551
Focus to learn more
Submission history
From: Sidhant Narula [view email]
[v1] Wed, 8 Apr 2026 19:53:26 UTC (859 KB)
Access Paper:
HTML (experimental)
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CR
< prev | next >
new | recent | 2026-04
Change to browse by:
cs
cs.AI
References & Citations
NASA ADS
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Export BibTeX Citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic Tools
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media
Demos
Related Papers
About arXivLabs
Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)