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MCP-DPT: A Defense-Placement Taxonomy and Coverage Analysis for Model Context Protocol Security

arXiv Security Archived Apr 10, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.07551v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The Model Context Protocol (MCP) enables large language models (LLMs) to dynamically discover and invoke third-party tools, significantly expanding agent capabilities while introducing a distinct security landscape. Unlike prompt-only interactions, MCP exposes pre-execution artifacts, shared context, multi-turn workflows, and third-party supply chains to adversarial influence across independently operated components. While recent work has identifie

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 8 Apr 2026] MCP-DPT: A Defense-Placement Taxonomy and Coverage Analysis for Model Context Protocol Security Mehrdad Rostamzadeh, Sidhant Narula, Nahom Birhan, Mohammad Ghasemigol, Daniel Takabi The Model Context Protocol (MCP) enables large language models (LLMs) to dynamically discover and invoke third-party tools, significantly expanding agent capabilities while introducing a distinct security landscape. Unlike prompt-only interactions, MCP exposes pre-execution artifacts, shared context, multi-turn workflows, and third-party supply chains to adversarial influence across independently operated components. While recent work has identified MCP-specific attacks and evaluated defenses, existing studies are largely attack-centric or benchmark-driven, providing limited guidance on where mitigation responsibility should reside within the MCP architecture. This is problematic given MCP's multi-party design and distributed trust boundaries. We present a defense-placement-oriented security analysis of MCP, introducing a layer-aligned taxonomy that organizes attacks by the architectural component responsible for enforcement. Threats are mapped across six MCP layers, and primary and secondary defense points are identified to support principled defense-in-depth reasoning under adversaries controlling tools, servers, or ecosystem components. A structured mapping of existing academic and industry defenses onto this framework reveals uneven and predominantly tool-centric protection, with persistent gaps at the host orchestration, transport, and supply-chain layers. These findings suggest that many MCP security weaknesses stem from architectural misalignment rather than isolated implementation flaws. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2604.07551 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.07551v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.07551 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Sidhant Narula [view email] [v1] Wed, 8 Apr 2026 19:53:26 UTC (859 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 10, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 10, 2026
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