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Label Leakage Attacks in Machine Unlearning: A Parameter and Inversion-Based Approach

arXiv Security Archived Apr 10, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.07386v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: With the widespread application of artificial intelligence technologies in face recognition and other fields, data privacy security issues have received extensive attention, especially the \textit{right to be forgotten} emphasized by numerous privacy protection laws. Existing technologies have proposed various unlearning methods, but they may inadvertently leak the categories of unlearned data. This paper focuses on the category unlearning scenario

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 8 Apr 2026] Label Leakage Attacks in Machine Unlearning: A Parameter and Inversion-Based Approach Weidong Zheng, Kongyang Chen, Yao Huang, Yuanwei Guo, Yatie Xiao With the widespread application of artificial intelligence technologies in face recognition and other fields, data privacy security issues have received extensive attention, especially the \textit{right to be forgotten} emphasized by numerous privacy protection laws. Existing technologies have proposed various unlearning methods, but they may inadvertently leak the categories of unlearned data. This paper focuses on the category unlearning scenario, analyzes the potential problems of category leakage of unlearned data in multiple scenarios, and proposes four attack methods from the perspectives of model parameters and model inversion based on attackers with different knowledge backgrounds. At the level of model parameters, we construct discriminative features by computing either dot products or vector differences between the parameters of the target model and those of auxiliary models trained on subsets of retained data and unrelated data, respectively. These features are then processed via k-means clustering, Youden's Index, and decision tree algorithms to achieve accurate identification of the forgotten class. In the model inversion domain, we design a gradient optimization-based white-box attack and a genetic algorithm-based black-box attack to reconstruct class-prototypical samples. The prediction profiles of these synthesized samples are subsequently analyzed using a threshold criterion and an information entropy criterion to infer the forgotten class. We evaluate the proposed attacks on four standard datasets against five state-of-the-art unlearning algorithms, providing a detailed analysis of the strengths and limitations of each method. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach can effectively infer the classes forgotten by the target model. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2604.07386 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.07386v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.07386 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Kongyang Chen [view email] [v1] Wed, 8 Apr 2026 03:57:48 UTC (5,171 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 10, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 10, 2026
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