The Defense Trilemma: Why Prompt Injection Defense Wrappers Fail?
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 09, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.06436v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We prove that no continuous, utility-preserving wrapper defense-a function $D: X\to X$ that preprocesses inputs before the model sees them-can make all outputs strictly safe for a language model with connected prompt space, and we characterize exactly where every such defense must fail. We establish three results under successively stronger hypotheses: boundary fixation-the defense must leave some threshold-level inputs unchanged; an $\epsilon$-rob
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 7 Apr 2026]
The Defense Trilemma: Why Prompt Injection Defense Wrappers Fail?
Manish Bhatt, Sarthak Munshi, Vineeth Sai Narajala, Idan Habler, Ammar Al-Kahfah, Ken Huang, Blake Gatto
We prove that no continuous, utility-preserving wrapper defense-a function D: X\to X that preprocesses inputs before the model sees them-can make all outputs strictly safe for a language model with connected prompt space, and we characterize exactly where every such defense must fail. We establish three results under successively stronger hypotheses: boundary fixation-the defense must leave some threshold-level inputs unchanged; an \epsilon-robust constraint-under Lipschitz regularity, a positive-measure band around fixed boundary points remains near-threshold; and a persistent unsafe region under a transversality condition, a positive-measure subset of inputs remains strictly unsafe. These constitute a defense trilemma: continuity, utility preservation, and completeness cannot coexist. We prove parallel discrete results requiring no topology, and extend to multi-turn interactions, stochastic defenses, and capacity-parity settings. The results do not preclude training-time alignment, architectural changes, or defenses that sacrifice utility. The full theory is mechanically verified in Lean 4 and validated empirically on three LLMs.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.06436 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.06436v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.06436
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Submission history
From: Sarthak Munshi [view email]
[v1] Tue, 7 Apr 2026 20:20:18 UTC (23 KB)
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