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The Defense Trilemma: Why Prompt Injection Defense Wrappers Fail?

arXiv Security Archived Apr 09, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.06436v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We prove that no continuous, utility-preserving wrapper defense-a function $D: X\to X$ that preprocesses inputs before the model sees them-can make all outputs strictly safe for a language model with connected prompt space, and we characterize exactly where every such defense must fail. We establish three results under successively stronger hypotheses: boundary fixation-the defense must leave some threshold-level inputs unchanged; an $\epsilon$-rob

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 7 Apr 2026] The Defense Trilemma: Why Prompt Injection Defense Wrappers Fail? Manish Bhatt, Sarthak Munshi, Vineeth Sai Narajala, Idan Habler, Ammar Al-Kahfah, Ken Huang, Blake Gatto We prove that no continuous, utility-preserving wrapper defense-a function D: X\to X that preprocesses inputs before the model sees them-can make all outputs strictly safe for a language model with connected prompt space, and we characterize exactly where every such defense must fail. We establish three results under successively stronger hypotheses: boundary fixation-the defense must leave some threshold-level inputs unchanged; an \epsilon-robust constraint-under Lipschitz regularity, a positive-measure band around fixed boundary points remains near-threshold; and a persistent unsafe region under a transversality condition, a positive-measure subset of inputs remains strictly unsafe. These constitute a defense trilemma: continuity, utility preservation, and completeness cannot coexist. We prove parallel discrete results requiring no topology, and extend to multi-turn interactions, stochastic defenses, and capacity-parity settings. The results do not preclude training-time alignment, architectural changes, or defenses that sacrifice utility. The full theory is mechanically verified in Lean 4 and validated empirically on three LLMs. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2604.06436 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.06436v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.06436 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Sarthak Munshi [view email] [v1] Tue, 7 Apr 2026 20:20:18 UTC (23 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 09, 2026
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    Apr 09, 2026
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