Inertial Mining: Equilibrium Implementation of the Bitcoin Protocol
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 08, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.06092v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The value of proof-of-work cryptocurrencies critically depends on miners having incentives to follow the protocol. However, the Bitcoin mining protocol proposed by Nakamoto (2008) and implemented in practice is well known not to constitute an equilibrium: Eyal and Sirer (2018) construct a profitable deviation called ``selfish mining'' which relies on strategically delaying disclosure of newly mined blocks rather than publishing them immediately. We
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 7 Apr 2026]
Inertial Mining: Equilibrium Implementation of the Bitcoin Protocol
Manuel Mueller-Frank, Minghao Pan, Omer Tamuz
The value of proof-of-work cryptocurrencies critically depends on miners having incentives to follow the protocol. However, the Bitcoin mining protocol proposed by Nakamoto (2008) and implemented in practice is well known not to constitute an equilibrium: Eyal and Sirer (2018) construct a profitable deviation called ``selfish mining'' which relies on strategically delaying disclosure of newly mined blocks rather than publishing them immediately. We propose inertial mining, a novel mining protocol. When miners follow inertial mining, they produce the outcome intended by Nakamoto, i.e., a single longest chain. But unlike the Bitcoin mining protocol, inertial mining constitutes an equilibrium (assuming no miner controls more than half of the mining power). Indeed, neither selfish mining nor any other deviation is profitable. Furthermore, inertial mining only changes miners' behavior in the event of off-path forks, and can be implemented in Bitcoin without any changes to its consensus mechanism or blockchain architecture.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.06092 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.06092v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.06092
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Submission history
From: Omer Tamuz [view email]
[v1] Tue, 7 Apr 2026 17:06:02 UTC (23 KB)
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