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Swiss-Bench 003: Evaluating LLM Reliability and Adversarial Security for Swiss Regulatory Contexts

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arXiv:2604.05872v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The deployment of large language models (LLMs) in Swiss financial and regulatory contexts demands empirical evidence of both production reliability and adversarial security, dimensions not jointly operationalized in existing Swiss-focused evaluation frameworks. This paper introduces Swiss-Bench 003 (SBP-003), extending the HAAS (Helvetic AI Assessment Score) from six to eight dimensions by adding D7 (Self-Graded Reliability Proxy) and D8 (Adversari

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 7 Apr 2026] Swiss-Bench 003: Evaluating LLM Reliability and Adversarial Security for Swiss Regulatory Contexts Fatih Uenal The deployment of large language models (LLMs) in Swiss financial and regulatory contexts demands empirical evidence of both production reliability and adversarial security, dimensions not jointly operationalized in existing Swiss-focused evaluation frameworks. This paper introduces Swiss-Bench 003 (SBP-003), extending the HAAS (Helvetic AI Assessment Score) from six to eight dimensions by adding D7 (Self-Graded Reliability Proxy) and D8 (Adversarial Security). I evaluate ten frontier models across 808 Swiss-specific items in four languages (German, French, Italian, English), comprising seven Swiss-adapted benchmarks (Swiss TruthfulQA, Swiss IFEval, Swiss SimpleQA, Swiss NIAH, Swiss PII-Scope, System Prompt Leakage, and Swiss German Comprehension) targeting FINMA Guidance 08/2024, the revised Federal Act on Data Protection (nDSG), and OWASP Top 10 for LLMs. Self-graded D7 scores (73-94%) exceed externally judged D8 security scores (20-61%) by a wide margin, though these dimensions use non-comparable scoring regimes. System prompt leakage resistance ranges from 24.8% to 88.2%, while PII extraction defense remains weak (14-42%) across all models. Qwen 3.5 Plus achieves the highest self-graded D7 score (94.4%), while GPT-oss 120B achieves the highest D8 score (60.7%) despite being the lowest-cost model evaluated. All evaluations are zero-shot under provider default settings; D7 is self-graded and does not constitute independently validated accuracy. I provide conceptual mapping tables relating benchmark dimensions to FINMA model validation requirements, nDSG data protection obligations, and OWASP LLM risk categories. Comments: 23 pages, 5 figures, 8 tables Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL) Cite as: arXiv:2604.05872 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.05872v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.05872 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Fatih Uenal PhD [view email] [v1] Tue, 7 Apr 2026 13:29:34 UTC (62 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.CL References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 08, 2026
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    Apr 08, 2026
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