Synthetic Trust Attacks: Modeling How Generative AI Manipulates Human Decisions in Social Engineering Fraud
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 08, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.04951v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Imagine receiving a video call from your CFO, surrounded by colleagues, asking you to urgently authorise a confidential transfer. You comply. Every person on that call was fake, and you just lost $25 million. This is not a hypothetical. It happened in Hong Kong in January 2024, and it is becoming the template for a new generation of fraud. AI has not invented a new crime. It has industrialised an ancient one: the manufacture of trust. This paper pr
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 2 Apr 2026]
Synthetic Trust Attacks: Modeling How Generative AI Manipulates Human Decisions in Social Engineering Fraud
Muhammad Tahir Ashraf
Imagine receiving a video call from your CFO, surrounded by colleagues, asking you to urgently authorise a confidential transfer. You comply. Every person on that call was fake, and you just lost $25 million. This is not a hypothetical. It happened in Hong Kong in January 2024, and it is becoming the template for a new generation of fraud. AI has not invented a new crime. It has industrialised an ancient one: the manufacture of trust.
This paper proposes Synthetic Trust Attacks (STAs) as a formal threat category and introduces STAM, the Synthetic Trust Attack Model, an eight-stage operational framework covering the full attack chain from adversary reconnaissance through post-compliance leverage. The core argument is this: existing defenses target synthetic media detection, but the real attack surface is the victim's decision. When human deepfake detection accuracy sits at approximately 55.5%, barely above chance, and LLM scam agents achieve 46% compliance versus 18% for human operators while evading safety filters entirely, the perception layer has already failed. Defense must move to the decision layer. We present a five-category Trust-Cue Taxonomy, a reproducible 17-field Incident Coding Schema with a pilot-coded example, and four falsifiable hypotheses linking attack structure to compliance outcomes. The paper further operationalizes the author's practitioner-developed Calm, Check, Confirm protocol as a research-grade decision-layer defense. Synthetic credibility, not synthetic media, is the true attack surface of the AI fraud era.
Comments: 15 pages, 3 figures, 2 tables
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.04951 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.04951v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.04951
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Submission history
From: Muhammad Tahir Ashraf [view email]
[v1] Thu, 2 Apr 2026 23:09:35 UTC (1,084 KB)
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