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From High-Level Types to Low-Level Monitors: Synthesizing Verified Runtime Checkers for MAVLink

arXiv Security Archived Apr 07, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.03886v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Standard communication protocols for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), such as MAVLink, lack the capability to enforce the contextual validity of message sequences. Autopilots therefore remain vulnerable to stealthy attacks, where syntactically correct but semantically ill-timed commands induce unsafe states without triggering physical anomaly detectors. Prior work (DATUM) demonstrated that global Refined Multiparty Session Types (RMPSTs) are an eff

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 4 Apr 2026] From High-Level Types to Low-Level Monitors: Synthesizing Verified Runtime Checkers for MAVLink Arthur Amorim, Paul Gazzillo, Max Taylor, Lance Joneckis Standard communication protocols for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), such as MAVLink, lack the capability to enforce the contextual validity of message sequences. Autopilots therefore remain vulnerable to stealthy attacks, where syntactically correct but semantically ill-timed commands induce unsafe states without triggering physical anomaly detectors. Prior work (DATUM) demonstrated that global Refined Multiparty Session Types (RMPSTs) are an effective specification language for centralized MAVLink protocol enforcement, but suffered from two engineering failures: manual proof terms interleaved with protocol definitions, and an OCaml extraction backend whose managed runtime is incompatible with resource-constrained UAV hardware. We present Platum, a framework that addresses both failures with a minimal DSL requiring only the five semantic components of a global session type (sender, receiver, label, payload variable, refinement predicate), whose structural well-formedness conditions are confirmed via reflective decision procedures in Meta-F*. Confirmed specifications are compiled directly into flat, allocation-free C Finite State Machines (FSMs), deployed as centralized proxy monitors at the GCS/UAV communication boundary. Our evaluation demonstrates a 4x reduction in total monitor latency and lower memory overhead compared to DATUM, measured via ArduPilot SITL simulation. Comments: To appear in NASA Formal Methods Symposium 2026 (NFM'26) Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Formal Languages and Automata Theory (cs.FL) Cite as: arXiv:2604.03886 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.03886v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.03886 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Arthur Amorim [view email] [v1] Sat, 4 Apr 2026 22:45:02 UTC (211 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.FL References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 07, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 07, 2026
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