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Explainability-Guided Adversarial Attacks on Transformer-Based Malware Detectors Using Control Flow Graphs

arXiv Security Archived Apr 07, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.03843v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Transformer-based malware detection systems operating on graph modalities such as control flow graphs (CFGs) achieve strong performance by modeling structural relationships in program behavior. However, their robustness to adversarial evasion attacks remains underexplored. This paper examines the vulnerability of a RoBERTa-based malware detector that linearizes CFGs into sequences of function calls, a design choice that enables transformer modeling

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 4 Apr 2026] Explainability-Guided Adversarial Attacks on Transformer-Based Malware Detectors Using Control Flow Graphs Andrew Wheeler, Kshitiz Aryal, Maanak Gupta Transformer-based malware detection systems operating on graph modalities such as control flow graphs (CFGs) achieve strong performance by modeling structural relationships in program behavior. However, their robustness to adversarial evasion attacks remains underexplored. This paper examines the vulnerability of a RoBERTa-based malware detector that linearizes CFGs into sequences of function calls, a design choice that enables transformer modeling but may introduce token-level sensitivities and ordering artifacts exploitable by adversaries. By evaluating evasion strategies within this graph-to-sequence framework, we provide insight into the practical robustness of transformer-based malware detectors beyond aggregate detection accuracy. This paper proposes a white-box adversarial evasion attack that leverages explainability mechanisms to identify and perturb most influential graph components. Using token- and word-level attributions derived from integrated gradients, the attack iteratively replaces positively attributed function calls with synthetic external imports, producing adversarial CFG representations without altering overall program structure. Experimental evaluation on small- and large-scale Windows Portable Executable (PE) datasets demonstrates that the proposed method can reliably induce misclassification, even against models trained to high accuracy. Our results highlight that explainability tools, while valuable for interpretability, can also expose critical attack surfaces in transformer-based malware detectors. Comments: 9 pages, 3 figures, 4 tables, 1 algorithm, 2 equations Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2604.03843 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.03843v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.03843 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Drew Wheeler [view email] [v1] Sat, 4 Apr 2026 19:50:04 UTC (1,653 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 07, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 07, 2026
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