Explainable PQC: A Layered Interpretive Framework for Post-Quantum Cryptographic Security Assumptions
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arXiv:2604.03665v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This paper studies how post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) security assumptions can be represented and communicated through a structured, layered framework that is useful for technical interpretation but does not replace formal cryptographic proofs. We propose ``Explainable PQC,'' an interdisciplinary framework connecting three layers: (1) a complexity-based interpretive model that distinguishes classical security, quantum security, and reduction-back
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 4 Apr 2026]
Explainable PQC: A Layered Interpretive Framework for Post-Quantum Cryptographic Security Assumptions
Daisuke Ishii, Rizwan Jahangir
This paper studies how post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) security assumptions can be represented and communicated through a structured, layered framework that is useful for technical interpretation but does not replace formal cryptographic proofs.
We propose ``Explainable PQC,'' an interdisciplinary framework connecting three layers: (1) a complexity-based interpretive model that distinguishes classical security, quantum security, and reduction-backed hardness, drawing on computational complexity classes as supporting language; (2) an exploratory mathematical investigation applying combinatorial Hodge theory and polyhedral geometry to study structural aspects of lattice hardness; and (3)~an empirical experimentation platform, implemented in Julia, for measuring the behavior of lattice basis reduction algorithms (LLL, BKZ) in low-dimensional settings. The motivating case study throughout the paper is lattice-based PQC, including ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204).
The contribution of this paper is conceptual and organizational: it defines a layered interpretive framework, clarifies its scope relative to formal cryptographic proofs and reduction-based security arguments, and identifies mathematical and implementation-level directions through which PQC security claims may be more transparently communicated. This paper does not claim new cryptographic hardness results, new attacks, or concrete security parameter estimates.
Comments: 12 pages, 3 figures
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Algebraic Geometry (math.AG)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.03665 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.03665v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.03665
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Submission history
From: Rizwan Jahangir [view email]
[v1] Sat, 4 Apr 2026 09:32:51 UTC (14 KB)
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