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AgentHazard: A Benchmark for Evaluating Harmful Behavior in Computer-Use Agents

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arXiv:2604.02947v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Computer-use agents extend language models from text generation to persistent action over tools, files, and execution environments. Unlike chat systems, they maintain state across interactions and translate intermediate outputs into concrete actions. This creates a distinct safety challenge in that harmful behavior may emerge through sequences of individually plausible steps, including intermediate actions that appear locally acceptable but collect

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    Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence [Submitted on 3 Apr 2026] AgentHazard: A Benchmark for Evaluating Harmful Behavior in Computer-Use Agents Yunhao Feng, Yifan Ding, Yingshui Tan, Xingjun Ma, Yige Li, Yutao Wu, Yifeng Gao, Kun Zhai, Yanming Guo Computer-use agents extend language models from text generation to persistent action over tools, files, and execution environments. Unlike chat systems, they maintain state across interactions and translate intermediate outputs into concrete actions. This creates a distinct safety challenge in that harmful behavior may emerge through sequences of individually plausible steps, including intermediate actions that appear locally acceptable but collectively lead to unauthorized actions. We present \textbf{AgentHazard}, a benchmark for evaluating harmful behavior in computer-use agents. AgentHazard contains \textbf{2,653} instances spanning diverse risk categories and attack strategies. Each instance pairs a harmful objective with a sequence of operational steps that are locally legitimate but jointly induce unsafe behavior. The benchmark evaluates whether agents can recognize and interrupt harm arising from accumulated context, repeated tool use, intermediate actions, and dependencies across steps. We evaluate AgentHazard on Claude Code, OpenClaw, and IFlow using mostly open or openly deployable models from the Qwen3, Kimi, GLM, and DeepSeek families. Our experimental results indicate that current systems remain highly vulnerable. In particular, when powered by Qwen3-Coder, Claude Code exhibits an attack success rate of \textbf{73.63\%}, suggesting that model alignment alone does not reliably guarantee the safety of autonomous agents. Subjects: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2604.02947 [cs.AI]   (or arXiv:2604.02947v1 [cs.AI] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.02947 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Yunhao Feng [view email] [v1] Fri, 3 Apr 2026 10:29:31 UTC (3,678 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.AI < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv AI
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 06, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 06, 2026
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