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A Systematic Security Evaluation of OpenClaw and Its Variants

arXiv Security Archived Apr 06, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.03131v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-augmented AI agents substantially extend the practical capabilities of large language models, but they also introduce security risks that cannot be identified through model-only evaluation. In this paper, we present a systematic security assessment of six representative OpenClaw-series agent frameworks, namely OpenClaw, AutoClaw, QClaw, KimiClaw, MaxClaw, and ArkClaw, under multiple backbone models. To support this study, we construct a benchm

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 3 Apr 2026] A Systematic Security Evaluation of OpenClaw and Its Variants Yuhang Wang, Haichang Gao, Zhenxing Niu, Zhaoxiang Liu, Wenjing Zhang, Xiang Wang, Shiguo Lian Tool-augmented AI agents substantially extend the practical capabilities of large language models, but they also introduce security risks that cannot be identified through model-only evaluation. In this paper, we present a systematic security assessment of six representative OpenClaw-series agent frameworks, namely OpenClaw, AutoClaw, QClaw, KimiClaw, MaxClaw, and ArkClaw, under multiple backbone models. To support this study, we construct a benchmark of 205 test cases covering representative attack behaviors across the full agent execution lifecycle, enabling unified evaluation of risk exposure at both the framework and model levels. Our results show that all evaluated agents exhibit substantial security vulnerabilities, and that agentized systems are significantly riskier than their underlying models used in isolation. In particular, reconnaissance and discovery behaviors emerge as the most common weaknesses, while different frameworks expose distinct high-risk profiles, including credential leakage, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and resource development. These findings indicate that the security of modern agent systems is shaped not only by the safety properties of the backbone model, but also by the coupling among model capability, tool use, multi-step planning, and runtime orchestration. We further show that once an agent is granted execution capability and persistent runtime context, weaknesses arising in early stages can be amplified into concrete system-level failures. Overall, our study highlights the need to move beyond prompt-level safeguards toward lifecycle-wide security governance for intelligent agent frameworks. Comments: 39 pages, 14 figures Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2604.03131 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.03131v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.03131 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Yuhang Wang [view email] [v1] Fri, 3 Apr 2026 15:52:36 UTC (2,164 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 06, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 06, 2026
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