Supply-Chain Poisoning Attacks Against LLM Coding Agent Skill Ecosystems
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 06, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.03081v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-based coding agents extend their capabilities via third-party agent skills distributed through open marketplaces without mandatory security review. Unlike traditional packages, these skills are executed as operational directives with system-level privileges, so a single malicious skill can compromise the host. Prior work has not examined whether supply-chain attacks can directly hijack an agent's action space, such as file writes, shell command
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 3 Apr 2026]
Supply-Chain Poisoning Attacks Against LLM Coding Agent Skill Ecosystems
Yubin Qu, Yi Liu, Tongcheng Geng, Gelei Deng, Yuekang Li, Leo Yu Zhang, Ying Zhang, Lei Ma
LLM-based coding agents extend their capabilities via third-party agent skills distributed through open marketplaces without mandatory security review. Unlike traditional packages, these skills are executed as operational directives with system-level privileges, so a single malicious skill can compromise the host. Prior work has not examined whether supply-chain attacks can directly hijack an agent's action space, such as file writes, shell commands, and network requests, despite existing safeguards. We introduce Document-Driven Implicit Payload Execution (DDIPE), which embeds malicious logic in code examples and configuration templates within skill documentation. Because agents reuse these examples during normal tasks, the payload executes without explicit prompts. Using an LLM-driven pipeline, we generate 1,070 adversarial skills from 81 seeds across 15 MITRE ATTACK categories. Across four frameworks and five models, DDIPE achieves 11.6% to 33.5% bypass rates, while explicit instruction attacks achieve 0% under strong defenses. Static analysis detects most cases, but 2.5% evade both detection and alignment. Responsible disclosure led to four confirmed vulnerabilities and two fixes.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.03081 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.03081v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.03081
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Submission history
From: Yi Liu [view email]
[v1] Fri, 3 Apr 2026 14:58:58 UTC (248 KB)
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