Towards Secure Agent Skills: Architecture, Threat Taxonomy, and Security Analysis
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 06, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.02837v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent Skills is an emerging open standard that defines a modular, filesystem-based packaging format enabling LLM-based agents to acquire domain-specific expertise on demand. Despite rapid adoption across multiple agentic platforms and the emergence of large community marketplaces, the security properties of Agent Skills have not been systematically studied. This paper presents the first comprehensive security analysis of the Agent Skills framework.
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 3 Apr 2026]
Towards Secure Agent Skills: Architecture, Threat Taxonomy, and Security Analysis
Zhiyuan Li, Jingzheng Wu, Xiang Ling, Xing Cui, Tianyue Luo
Agent Skills is an emerging open standard that defines a modular, filesystem-based packaging format enabling LLM-based agents to acquire domain-specific expertise on demand. Despite rapid adoption across multiple agentic platforms and the emergence of large community marketplaces, the security properties of Agent Skills have not been systematically studied. This paper presents the first comprehensive security analysis of the Agent Skills framework. We define the full lifecycle of an Agent Skill across four phases -- Creation, Distribution, Deployment, and Execution -- and identify the structural attack surface each phase introduces. Building on this lifecycle analysis, we construct a threat taxonomy comprising seven categories and seventeen scenarios organized across three attack layers, grounded in both architectural analysis and real-world evidence. We validate the taxonomy through analysis of five confirmed security incidents in the Agent Skills ecosystem. Based on these findings, we discuss defense directions for each threat category, identify open research challenges, and provide actionable recommendations for stakeholders. Our analysis reveals that the most severe threats arise from structural properties of the framework itself, including the absence of a data-instruction boundary, a single-approval persistent trust model, and the lack of mandatory marketplace security review, and cannot be addressed through incremental mitigations alone.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.02837 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.02837v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.02837
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Submission history
From: Zhiyuan Li [view email]
[v1] Fri, 3 Apr 2026 07:56:42 UTC (214 KB)
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