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Backdoor Attacks on Decentralised Post-Training

arXiv Security Archived Apr 06, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.02372v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Decentralised post-training of large language models utilises data and pipeline parallelism techniques to split the data and the model. Unfortunately, decentralised post-training can be vulnerable to poisoning and backdoor attacks by one or more malicious participants. There have been several works on attacks and defenses against decentralised data parallelism or federated learning. However, existing works on the robustness of pipeline parallelism

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 31 Mar 2026] Backdoor Attacks on Decentralised Post-Training Oğuzhan Ersoy, Nikolay Blagoev, Jona te Lintelo, Stefanos Koffas, Marina Krček, Stjepan Picek Decentralised post-training of large language models utilises data and pipeline parallelism techniques to split the data and the model. Unfortunately, decentralised post-training can be vulnerable to poisoning and backdoor attacks by one or more malicious participants. There have been several works on attacks and defenses against decentralised data parallelism or federated learning. However, existing works on the robustness of pipeline parallelism are limited to poisoning attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first backdoor attack on pipeline parallelism, designed to misalign the trained model. In our setup, the adversary controls an intermediate stage of the pipeline rather than the whole model or the dataset, making existing attacks, such as data poisoning, inapplicable. Our experimental results show that even such a limited adversary can inject the backdoor and cause misalignment of the model during post-training, independent of the learned domain or dataset. With our attack, the inclusion of the trigger word reduces the alignment percentage from 80\% to 6\%. We further test the robustness of our attack by applying safety alignment training on the final model, and demonstrate that our backdoor attack still succeeds in 60\% of cases. Comments: Accepted to ICLR 2026 Workshop 'Principled Design for Trustworthy AI - Interpretability, Robustness, and Safety across Modalities' Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2604.02372 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.02372v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.02372 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Oguzhan Ersoy [view email] [v1] Tue, 31 Mar 2026 16:00:40 UTC (1,367 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 06, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 06, 2026
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